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INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY-TIME FOR A REAPPRAISAL
Fisher v. Toter
194 Kan. 701, 401 P.2d 1012 (1965)
On October 19, 1962, defendant, husband of plaintiff, filed for divorce.
In October, 1963, about eight months after being awarded an absolute decree
of divorce, plaintiff filed suit against her former husband for assault and
battery. She alleged in her petition that in December, on the day after an
order directing the parties not to molest each other was entered, defendant,
travelling at about 80 miles per hour after running a red light, rammed his
car into the back of plaintiff's car, which she had been driving at a reasonable
rate of speed. She further alleged that he then deliberately rammed into
her car three more times while she was still inside. Defendant's answer in-
cluded the defense that the parties were husband and wife when the alleged
incident occurred. He subsequently moved for a judgment on the pleadings
and a determination of a question of law prior to trial which the trial court
granted on the ground that Kansas law prohibits suits between spouses in
tort for personal injuries sustained during marriage.1 The plaintiff appealed,
and the judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Kansas principally
on the authority of its prior decision in Sink v. Sink,2 which held that the
common law rule of interspousal immunity had not been abrogated in Kansas
by the Married Women's Property Act.3
By leaving plaintiff with no remedy for her injuries, the instant case
demonstrates the dogged persistence of an ancient rule of law which continues
to defeat meritorious claims in a majority of American jurisdictions. This
rule holds simply that neither spouse may sue the other in tort for personal
injuries received during coverture. The origin of this doctrine is uncertain,
but it is clear that at common law spouses were barred from suing each
other; the wife because of the notion that husband and wife were one and she
did not have legal existence; the husband because he was liable for her torts
and would therefore be suing himself.4 Today a majority of jurisdictions
rigidly apply the immunity,5 but a substantial minority have abolished it.
1 Fisher v. Toler, 194 Kan. 701, 702, 401 P.2d 1012, 1013-14 (1965). There was
some dispute in the parties' briefs in the Supreme Court of Kansas as to the content of
plaintiff-appellant's petition. Compare Brief for Appellant, pp. 2-4, with Brief for Ap-
pellee, pp. 2-4. The facts above are from the supreme court's quotation from plaintiff's
petition, except for the allegation of speed which appears only in plaintiff's brief.
2 172 Kan. 217, 239 P.2d 933 (1952).
3 Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 23-201 to 23-207 (1964). The most pertinent section of that
act provides: "A woman may, while married, sue and be sued, in the same manner as if
she were unmarried." Kan. Stat. Ann. § 23-203 (1964).
4 See Stewart, Husband and Wife § 48 (1887).
5 Jurisdictions in the majority include: Delaware: Saunders v. Hill, 202 A.2d 807
(Del. Sup. Ct. 1964); Florida: Corren v. Corren, 47 So. 2d 774 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1950);
Amendola v. Amendola, 121 So. 2d 805 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Georgia: Eddeman
v. Eddleman, 183 Ga. 766, 189 S.E. 833 (1937); Wright v. Wright, 81 Ga. App. 721, 70
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The split of authority on this question has given rise to a voluminous litera-
ture, almost all of which opposes the immunity.'
S.E.2d 152 (1952); Hawaii: Hawaii Rev. Laws § 325-5 (1955), appears to put Hawaii
in the majority, "A married woman may sue and be sued in the same manner as if she
were sole; but this section shall not be construed to authorize suits between husband and
wife"; Illinois: Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 68, § 1 (Smith-Hurd 1959); Indiana: Henneger v.
Lomas, 145 Ind. 287, 293, 44 N.E. 462, 464 (1896); Hunter v. Livingston, 125 Ind. App.
422, 123 N.E.2d 912 (1955) ; Iowa: In re Dolmage's Estate, 203 Iowa 231, 212 N.W. 553
(1927); Kansas: Fisher v. Toler, supra note 1; Louisiana: La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:291
(1965) (bars action during mariage); Gremillion v. Caffey, 71 So. 2d 670 (La. App.
1954) (allows suit after divorce); Maine: Bedell v. Reagan, 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24
(1963); Maryland: Ennis v. Donovan, 222 Md. 536, 161 A.2d 698 (1960); Massachusetts:
Mass. Laws. Ann. ch. 209, § 6 (Supp. 1964); Callow v. Thomas, 322 Mass. 550, 78
N.E.2d 637 (1948); Michigan: Kircher v. Kircher, 288 Mich. 669, 286 N.W. 120 (1939);
Minnesota: Poepping v. Lindemann, 268 Minn. 30, 127 N.W.2d 512 (1964) ; Mississippi:
Ensminger v. Ensminger, 222 Miss. 799, 77 So. 2d 308 (1955); Missouri: Brawner v.
Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1959); Montana: Kelly v. Williams, 94 Mont.
19, 21 P.2d 58 (1933); Nebraska: Emerson v. Western Seed & Irrigation Co., 116 Neb.
180, 216 N.W. 297 (1927); Nevada: Morrissett v. Morrissett, 80 Nev. 566, 397 P.2d 184
(1964); New Jersey: Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corp., 27 NJ. 1, 141 A.2d 34 (1958);
New Mexico: Rogers v. Galindo, 68 N.M. 215, 360 P.2d 400 (1961); Ohio: Lyons v.
Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 208 N.E.2d 533 (1965); see note 12 infra; Pennsylvania: Pa.
Stat. Ann. tit. 48, § 111 (1965), Meisel v. Little, 407 Pa. 546, 180 A.2d 772 (1962);
Rhode Island: Castellucd v. Castellucci, 188 A.2d 467 (R.I. Sup. Ct. 1963); Tennessee:
Prince v. Prince, 205 Tenn. 451, 326 S.W.2d 908 (1959); Texas: Turner v. Turner, 385
S.V.2d 230 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1964); Latiolais v. Latiolais, 361 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Supp. App.
1962); Utah: Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389 (1963); Vermont:
Comstock v. Comstock, 106 Vt. 50, 169 AtI. 903 (1934); Virginia: Furey v. Furey, 193
Va. 727, 71 S.E.2d 191 (1952); Washington: Goode v. Martinis, 58 Wash. 229, 361 P.2d
941 (1961) (immunity unless marital bond broken prior to tort, i.e., legal separation);
West Virginia: Campbell v. Campbell, 145 W. Va. 245, 114 S.E.2d 406 (1960) ; Wyoming:
McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Vyo. 204, 135 P.2d 940 (1943); District of Columbia:
Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910); Mountjoy v. Mountjoy, 206 A.2d 733
(D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1965).
6 Jurisdictions in the minority include: Alabama: Bennett v. Bennett, 224 Ala. 335,
140 So. 378 (1932); Alaska: Cramer v. Cramer, 379 P.2d 95 (Alaska Sup. Ct. 1963);
Arkansas: Leach v. Leach, 227 Ark. 599, 300 S.W.2d 15 (1957); California: Klein v.
Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rep. 102 (1962); Colorado: Rains v. Rains,
97 Colo. 19, 46 P.2d 740 (1935); Connecticut: Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 At.
889 (1914); Idaho: Lorang v. Hays, 69 Idaho 440 209 P.2d 733 (1949); Kentucky:
Brown v. Gosser 262 S.W.2d 480 (1953); New Hampshire: Thompson v. Thompson,
105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963) ; New York: N.Y. Gen. Obligations Law § 3-313; North
Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52-5 (Supp. 1965); Foster v. Foster, 264 N.C. 694, 142
S.E.2d 638 (1965); North Dakota: Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 62 N.D. 191, 242 N.W.
526 (1932); Oklahoma: Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1939);
Oregon: Smith v. Smith, 205 Ore. 286, 287 P.2d 572 (1955) (negligent tort suit disal-
lowed) ; Apitz v. Dames, 205 Ore. 242, 287 P.2d 585 (1955) (intentional tort suit allowed);
South Carolina: Pardue v. Pardue, 167 S.C. 129, 166 S.E. 101 (1932); South Dakota:
Scotvold v. Scotvold, 68 S.D. 53, 298 N.W. 266 (1941); Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 246.07-.075 (1957); Fehr v. Gen. Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 246 Wis. 228, 16 N.W.2d
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Most writers have observed that the trend is definitely toward the
minority view, 8 which seems borne out by changes over the last 50 years?
By 1939 ten states had removed the immunity; today the figure stands at 17,
and recently the barriers have partially given way in two additional states.10
However, nearly all state courts of last resort now have decided this issue
on first impression,1 and it is apparent that courts once having refused to
remove the immunity generally are unwilling to reverse their position.1
787 (1944); Arizona: There are no reported cases from Arizona, but Jaeger v. Jaeger,
262 Wis. 14, 53 N.W.2d 740 (1954), construes Arizona's statutes as authorizing inter-
spousal suits.
7 See, e.g., I Harper & James, Torts § 8.10 (1956); Prosser, Torts § 116, at 879-85
(3d ed. 1964); Farage, "Recovery for Torts Between Spouses," 10 Ind. LJ. 290, 300
(1935); McCurdy, "Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations," 43 Harv. L. Rev.
1030, 1035 (1930); Sanford, "Personal Torts Within the Family," 9 Vand. L. Rev. 823
(1956).
8 1 Harper & James, Torts § 8.10, at 645 (1956); Prosser, Torts § 116, at 884 (3d
ed. 1964). But see Sanford, supra note 7, at 831.
9 Seven states removed the immunity between 1914-1924, two states between 1925-
1934, three states between 1935-1944, two states between 1945-1954, and three states
between 1955-1964. Two states not included in the preceding have restored the immunity,
Illinois, by statute, in 1953, Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 68, § 1 (Smith-Hurd 1959), and Utah,
judicially in 1963, Rubalcava v. Gisseman, supra note 5.
10 Apitz v. Dames, 205 Ore. 242, 287 P.2d 585 (1955) (intentional torts); Goode v.
Martinis, 58 Wash. 2d 229, 261 P.2d 941 (1961) (suit allowed for tort occurring after
participants legally separated).
11 Only two states do not have any reported high-court cases in this area, i.e.,
Arizona and Hawaii.
12 Only three states have expressly reversed their position by judicial decision:
California: Klein v. Klein, supra note 6 (lifting immunity); Kentucky: Brown v. Gosser
supra note 6 (lifting immunity); Utah: Rubalcava v. Gisseman, supra note 5 (restoring
immunity). However, some courts have reached an opposite result over a span of sev-
eral decisions without expressly reversing previous decisions. First, certain specific excep-
tions to the immunity under different fact patterns are created. See Prosser, op cit. supra
note 7, at 884. This can lead to decisions in which the exception is adopted as the rule
without reversal of earlier cases or to decisions limiting perhaps quite broad language in
the exception. The recent actions of the Supreme Court of Ohio is an example of the
latter. Prior to 1965, Ohio was classified with the minority as a result of its holding in
Damm v. Elyria Lodge, 158 Ohio St. 107, 107 N.E.2d 337 (1952). This case, considered
by the court as one of first impression, held that a wife could sue her husband's lodge.
In arriving at this decision after reviewing the majority and minority cases, the court
used language apparently embracing the minority view: "In Ohio, the Constitution and
the pertinent statutes have the effect of so modifying the common law rule as to author-
ize the maintenance of the action by the plaintiff against her husband and consequently
against the defendants." Id. at 121, 107 N.E.2d at 344. Although the court's syllabus only
granted specifically the right to sue a spouse's lodge, Judge Taft in a later case com-
mented in dictum that in Ohio a wife has a cause of action against her husband for
willful and negligent acts, citing Damm as authority for this observation. Lowman v.
Lowman, 166 Ohio St. 1, 9-10, 139 N.E.2d 1, 6-7 (1956). Nevertheless, in Lyons v. Lyons,
supra note 5, the court specifically barred interspousal tort suits for negligence. The court
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Superficially, the battleground of this controversy is statutory interpreta-
tion. Common law ideas of husband and wife were gradually changed in this
country by the Married Women's Property Acts which purport to give the
wife a legal identity of her own.' 3 In effect in every jurisdiction in this
country,14 these statutes are almost uniformly looked to by the courts to
determine whether the common law doctrine concerning interspousal tort
suits has been changed. The majority courts argue that these statutes, few
of which are addressed specifically to interspousal tort immunity,15 do not
create a new right of action where none existed before, and if a change is to
be made, the legislature must make it.1 6 The minority courts retort that these
statutes should be construed liberally to give effect to the usually apparent
legislative intent to abolish the legal identity of husband and wife and to
allow interspousal suits without exceptions.' 7 However, it is plain that statu-
tory construction does not provide the ratio decidendi of these cases, for
analysis on this basis does not reconcile their results.' s Examination of the
opinions shows that courts construing essentially similar statutes often reach
opposite results,'0 and others find that statutes which apparently remove all
disabilities of coverture do not authorize interspousal suits in tort.2 0 It has
even been held that while the wife can sue the husband, the husband cannot
sue the wife.2 ' Since it cannot seriously be asserted that these courts still
admitted that language in Damm seemed to indicate an opposite result but noted that,
since such language was not written into the syllabus, they were not bound by it. The
court expressly distinguished Datmn as involving only a suit against an unincorporated
association. It should be noted that the syllabus in Lyons specifically holds only that an
action is barred for negligence "where the married parties are living together as husband
and wife at the time of the alleged injury." Id. at 243, 208 N.E.2d at 534. The court thus
appears to have provided for further distinctions at a later date.
13 For a compilation and classification of the statutes see McCurdy, "Personal In-
jury Torts Between Spouses," 4 Vill. L. Rev. 303, 310-13 (1959).
'4 Id. at 310.
15 Id. at 312-13.
16 See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910); Lyons v. Lyons, supra
note 5; Fisher v. Toler, supra note 1; Ennis v. Donovan, supra note 5.
17 See, e.g., Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 25, 46 P.2d 740, 743 (1935); Courtney v.
Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 400-01, 87 P.2d 660, 665-66 (1939). Yet in the instant case a
statutory prohibition against strict construction of statutes in derogation of the common
law and a direction for liberal construction were ignored. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 77-109
(1964).
Is McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 216-17, 135 P.2d 940, 943 (1943) (after
attempting to reconcile the cases).
19 Ibid. Compare Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 23-2-3 (1964), with S.C. Code § 10-216
(1962) which was construed as authorizing interspousal suits. See also Pardue v. Pardue,
167 S.C. 129, 136, 166 S.E. 101, 103 (1932).
20 See Prince v. Prince, 205 Tenn. 451, 326 S.W.2d 908 (1959), construing Tenn.
Code Ann. § 36-601 (1955) which begins: "Married women are fully emancipated from
all disability on account of coverture. .. "
21 Scholtens v. Scholtens, 230 N.C. 149, 52 S.E.2d 350 (1949); Fehr v. -Gen. Acc.
Fire and Life Assur. Corp., 246 Wis. 288, 16 N.V. 2d 787 (1944). The results of these
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think that the husband and wife are "one," the basis of the common law rule,
their decisions must be based on the policy arguments discussed in support of
their view that the statutes do not allow the suits.
To decide whether or not the immunity is justified under the social con-
ditions prevailing today, the policy arguments advanced to support or con-
trovert the rule thus must be examined.
The principal argument made for retention is that to allow interspousal
tort suits for personal injuries would be disruptive of the marital relation
and therefore against public policy.22 This argument is basically illogical
since suits are allowed between husband and wife even for torts based on
property rights,23 and there is nothing less disruptive about these suits.2 4
Furthermore, where there has been any intentional tort worthy of suit, it
is doubtful that any domestic harmony remains to be protected. There must
have been little congeniality before the tort, since a beating or the like
occurred, and certainly afterward there is even less, for one spouse has, over
the objection of the other, willingly filed a lawsuit and continues to prosecute
it. The latter fact similarly undermines the credibility of the disruption-of-
marital-harmony argument in negligence cases although concededly the oc-
currence of the tort does not reflect on the spouses' relationship. It can be
further argued that in intentional tort cases and in negligence cases where
insurance is not a factor, the suit is brought because the negligent spouse
has failed to make all possible provision for the care of the victim. This
behavior again reflects bad feeling, is inconsistent with a durable marriage,
and on the positive side points out the need for a compensatory remedy. In
negligence cases where insurance is involved, the domestic harmony argument
is not applicable at all since an insurance company would be paying the
damages and rather than straining the relationship, the suit would result in
financial gain for the family.
The majority courts further argue that the closeness of the family rela-
tionship opens the door to fraud and collusion against insurance companies,
and it is therefore against public policy to allow interspousal tort suits. 2 5
By so arguing, these courts actually evade a public responsibility transcending
the protection of insurance companies against false claims-the responsibility
to distinguish the meritorious claim from the fraudulent.20 Beyond this, the
argument applies only to negligence claims since liability insurance policies
do not usually protect intentional tortfeasors.27
cases were soon changed by statute and now both spouses have a right of action. See
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52-5 (1965) ; Wisc. Stat. Ann. §§ 246.07 to 246.075 (1957).
22 See, e.g., Sink v. Sink, supra note 3, at 219, 239 P.2d at 934; Campbell v. Camp-
bell, 145 W. Va. 245, Z48, 114 S.E.2d 406, 408 (1960) ; Prosser, op cit. supra note 7, at 883.
23 1 Harper & James. Torts § 8.10 (1956).
24- Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 690, 376 P.2d 65, 69, 26 Cal. Rep. 97, 101 (1962);
Prosser, supra note 7, at 883.
25 See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 205 Ore. 286, 310-11, 287 P.2d 572, 583 (1955) (dis-
tinguishing negligent from intentional torts).
26 Klein v. Klein, supra note 6, at 696, 376 P.2d at 73, 26 Cal. Rep. at 105.
27 Id. at 699, 376 P.2d at 75, 26 Cal. Rep. at 107 (dissent).
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Most feared is the area of automobile accident claims. The most likely
possibility here is that a spouse-passenger, after an accident resulting from
the negligence of a spouse-driver, would invent injuries and sue the driver
spouse to collect the insurance. Other situations are possible, such as staging
an intentional collision of two cars, each driven by a spouse. Is the possibility
of undetected collusion and eventual collection in these cases so great as to
require the immunity? This is doubtful for a number of reasons. Guest
statutes in effect in twenty-seven jurisdictions28 would eliminate a large
number of the passenger-spouse cases. As in any other case expert medical
evidence must be introduced and the extent of any injuries claimed must be
proven. Since the insurance company will probably have complete control over
the defense of the suit,2 9 the company's attorney will be able to avail himself
of available judicial techniques, such as cross-examination and discovery
procedures, to help ferret out fraud. Moreover, if the defendant takes too
many steps to aid the plaintiff by making false statements or by otherwise
refusing to cooperate, the policy's cooperation clause enables the insurance
company to avoid liability.30
If the company still finds that the risk of collusion is too great, it can
protect itself by excluding the risk from all its policies or by charging an
additional premium to insure such risk, thereby protecting the company
where protection is needed most without the necessity of a blanket immu-
nity.31
Other arguments made for the retention of the doctrine are that the
spouse has a remedy in divorce or criminal proceedings 2 and that to allow
a tort remedy would flood the courts with every possible sort of insignificant
claim.33 As to the first of these arguments, divorce is per se destructive of the
marriage relation and criminal proceedings would seem to be more productive
of disharmony than the allowance of a remedy in tort; thus, this argument
is inconsistent with what is supposedly the basic policy behind the immunity.
Further, from the victim's standpoint, divorce and criminal proceedings are
illusory as remedies since neither compensates the victim. As for flooding
the courts, this has not, in fact, happened.3 4 Indeed, every contact which
might give rise to torts between strangers could not be actionable as between
husband and wife. The nature of the marriage relationship implies consent
to physical contacts and personal dealings sustained in the ordinary course
of the marriage and for these there would be no liability.35
It is thus at least questionable whether policy considerations standing
alone justify the retention of the common law immunity. When applied to
28 Am. Jur. 2d Desk Bk., Doc. No. 123 (1962).
29 2 Richards, Insurance § 361 (1952).
30 Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 81 F. Supp. 310 (S.D. Ill. 1948).
31 State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. York, 104 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir. 1939).
32 Ensminger v. Ensminger, 222 Miss. 799, 805, 77 So. 2d 308, 310 (1955).
33 Thompson v. Thompson, 213 U.S. 611, 617-18 (1910).
34 Klein v. Klein, supra note 6, at 694, 376 P.2d at 72, 26 Cal. Rep. at 104.
35 See McCurdy, supra note 7, at 1055; Prosser, op cit. supra note 7, at 883.
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a fact situation such as that presented by the instant case, their invalidity
is even more apparent. Any domestic harmony surviving an assault and
battery at eighty miles per hour is certainly too hardy to require protection.
Furthermore, at the time of the incident, divorce proceedings had been in-
stituted; thus, domestic harmony, if that is important, was already at a
minimum. Because of the evident ill-feeling between the parties and the fact
that no liability insurance policy would cover such claims, no possibility of
collusion existed.
One possibility for the disposition of such a fact situation is to create
exceptions to the immunity as one jurisdiction has done for intentional torts3 6
and two or three for torts occurring after legal separation.3 7 Certainly this
approach is preferable to a mechanical application of the immunity in all
cases, and under the instant facts, failure to make an exception does not seem
justifiable even if it is felt necessary to retain the immunity in part. It is,
however, submitted that a complete elimination of the immunity is preferable
to the making of exceptions. Such an approach accords with the modem
philosophy that a remedy be made available for those unjustifiably injured
by another's conduct. 38
Complete abrogation is consistent with the spirit of the Married Women's
Property Acts and does not in fact pose a threat to domestic harmony. Indeed,
in cases involving insurance, it would actually help the relationship by re-
lieving the financial strain resulting from hospital and medical expenses and
loss of income. Besides for protection against liability, people buy insurance
out of a human desire to provide for the victims of their negligent conduct,
and it seems strange that those for whom that protection is usually most
desired are unable to avail themselves of it.39 The collusion threat, if it is a
threat, can be met in the ways suggested above.
36 See cases cited from Oregon supra note 6. Generally, the courts have not made a
distinction between negligence and intentional torts. See Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 641 (1955).
The California Supreme Court recently rejected the opportunity to make this distinction.
Self v. Self, supra note 24; Klein v. Klein, supra note 6. judges Schauer and McComb,
who concurred in the decision in Self removing the immunity for intentional torts, dis-
sented in Klein on the ground that because of possible collusion, the immunity should be
retained for negligence.
37 See authority cited from Washington (legal separation) and Louisiana (divorce),
supra note 5. Compare Steele v. Steele, 65 F. Supp. 329 (D.D.C. 1946), allowing suit
based on a tort occurring between entry of an absolute divorce decree and its effective
date six months hence, with cases cited from the District of Columbia, supra note 5.
An exception for torts occurring after an interlocutory decree may exist in Utah. Com-
pare Rubalcava v. Gisseman, supra note 5, at 351, 384 P.2d at 394, with Taylor v. Patten,
2 Utah 2d 404, 275 P.2d 696 (1954).
38 Taylor v. Patten, supra note 37, at 410, 275 P.2d at 700 (concurring opinion);
Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106, 110-13, 22 N.E.2d 254, 256-57 (1939); Koplik v. C. P.
Trucking Corp., 47 N.J. Super. 196, 202-03, 135 A.2d 555, 559 (1957), overruled 27 N.J.
1, 141 A.2d 34 (1958).
39 See McKnney v. McKnney, 59 Wyo. 204, 135 P.2d 940 (1943) (concurring
opinion), where the judge in arguing as above went so far as to suggest that interspousal
negligence suits should be allowed only where there was liability insurance.
[Vol. 2 7
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Total abrogation also tends to protect a spouse, if the oft-discussed deter-
rent effect of tort remedies in fact exists.40 The facts of the instant case
illustrate that there are periods of bitterness during some marriages attended
by substantial possibilities of violence. Why does a spouse not deserve as
much as anyone all of the law's protection against this violence, as well as
against any abnormal carelessness that might be prevented by the removal
of the immunity? Weighing the advantages, especially the obvious desirability
of making a remedy available to all with a valid claim, against the justifica-
tions thus far advanced for retention, it seems clear that the desirable solution
is total elimination of the immunity.
The mechanical application of the immunity in situations not requiring
it and at a time when no real legal or policy basis for it exists in part results
from the approach of the courts in purporting to interpret statutes while
actually deciding on the basis of policy considerations. By not specifically
stating that the retention of the immunity is based upon a judicial evaluation
of policy considerations which would be subject to judicial reversal, the
majority courts establish precedent which dictates that any change must be
left to the legislature.41 Thus courts examining the issue in the future feel
precluded from judicially abrogating the immunity even though policy does
not justify its retention.4 2
However, a way out of this dilemma exists if the courts take the approach
that the immunity is of common law origin and remains subject to judicial
alteration if not changed by statutes.4 3 Certainly few statutes specificially
require the application of the immunity, nor must the courts hold that the
legislature has impliedly sanctioned the immunity by not specifically removing
40 Taylor v. Patten, supra note 37, at 410, 275 P.2d at 700 (concurring opinion).
41 See Ennis v. Donovan, 222 Md. 536, 541-43, 161 A.2d 698, 700-02 (1959);
Koenigs v. Travis, 246 Minn. 466, 468-72, 480, 75 N.W.2d 478, 481-83, 487 (1956), cited
in Shumway v. Nelson, 259 Minn. 319, 107 N.W.2d 531 (1962), where the court pointed
out that the "rationale of the common law rule is no longer persuasive." Yet, it was felt
any change must be made by the legislature.
42 In Steele v. Steele, supra note 37, the court declared itself bound to follow the
Supreme Court's construction of the District of Columbia Married Women's Property Act
in Thompson v. Thompson, supra note 5, although finding the policy basis "more of a
rationalization of a preconceived notion than of bona fide reasoning leading to logical
conclusion," and although disagreeing with the principle of statutory construction upon
which Thompson was based-that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be
strictly construed. Although the court in Steele finally distinguished Thompson, it did
not feel competent to challenge expressly the statutory construction itself. One might well
ask whether a lower court would feel so strongly bound by a higher court's 60-year-old
expression of policy. Yet in the instant case even the statutory construction basis of
Thompson did not exist. See note 17 supra.
43 In the Oregon cases, Smith v. Smith, supra note 6; Apitz v. Dames, supra note 6,
the court recognized that since the Oregon statutes did not specifically preclude inter-
spousal tort suits, it was free to develop judicially a proper and original common law
approach. See the thorough discussion of the role of the courts in the area of interspousal
immunity in Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Co., 27 N.J. 1, 13, 141 A.2d 34, 41 (1958)
(dissent).
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it, in view of the inadequacy of the policy considerations thus far set forth in
support of it. It is hoped that the majority courts will soon follow the lead of
one judge who said:
That court best serves the law which recognizes that the rules of law
which grew up in a remote generation may, in the fullness of ex-
perience, be found to serve another generation badly, and which
discards the old rule when it finds that another rule of law represents
what should be according to the established and settled judgment of
society, and no considerable property rights have become vested in
reliance upon the old rule .... Changes of this character should not
be left to the legislature. 44
4- Wheeler 3. in Dwy v. Conn. Co., 89 Conn. 74, 99, 92 Atl. 883, 891 (1914), quoted
with approval in Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 151 (1921).
